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1. Introduction
Many systems of interconnected components are exposed to the risk of cascading fail-
ures. The latter arises from interdependencies or interlinkage, where the failure of a single
entity (or small set of entities) can result in a cascade of failures jeopardizing the whole
system. This phenomenon occurs in various kinds of systems. Well-known examples in-
clude ‘black-outs’ in power grids, where overload redistribution following the failure of a
single component can result in a cascade of failures that ripples through the entire grid (e.g.
Rosas-Casals et al. (2007), Wang et al. (2010)). The internet and computer networks also
exhibit this phenomenon—one manifestation being the spread of malware (e.g. Lelarge and
Bolot (2008b), Balthrop et al. (2004) and Cohen et al. (2000)). Likewise, human populations
are exposed to the spread of contagious diseases3.
While the existing work tends to be mostly descriptive, less attention has been devoted to
studying the incentives to guard against the risk of cascading failures. In early 2015, a measles
epidemic spread across the western part of the Unites States. It was reported that one of
the causes was the unwillingness of parents to vaccinate their children (e.g. The Economist
(5 February 2015), The Economist (4 February 2015), Reuters (27 August 2015)). Indeed,
some people may want to avoid the perceived risks of a vaccine’s side effects and free-ride on
the “herd immunity” provided by the vaccination of other people. This raises the following
question: what are the incentives to vaccinate against a contagious disease? The same type
of question can be asked about other systems subject to the risk of cascading failures. What
are the incentives to invest in computer security solutions to protect against the spread of
malware? What incentives do airports have to invest in security equipment/personnel? How
does the structure of interactions between individuals, computers or airports affect those
incentives? The literature studying such strategic decisions is still in its early stages. Some
papers worth noting are Lelarge and Bolot (2008b), Lelarge and Bolot (2008a), Lelarge and
Bolot (2009), Galeotti and Rogers (2013), Dziubinski and Goyal (2014), Goyal and Vigier
(2014) and Blume et al. (2011). There is also a literature on games of “interdependent
security” (e.g. Heal and Kunreuther (2005), Heal et al. (2006) and Johnson et al. (2010)),
but a complex networked interaction structure is generally not studied4.
In this paper, we develop a framework to study the incentives that agents have to invest
in protection against cascading failures in networked systems. A set of interconnected agents
can each fail individually or as a result of a cascade of failures. Depending on the application,
failure can mean a human being contracting an infectious disease, a computer being infected
by a virus or an airport being exposed to a security event (e.g. a suspicious luggage or
passenger being checked in or being in transit). Each agent must decide on whether to
make a costly investment in protection against cascading failures. This investment can
mean vaccination, investing in computer security solutions or airport security equipment, to
3For different applications, such as cascading risk in financial systems, see Amini et al. (2011), Acemoglu
et al. (2013), Elliott et al. (2013), Thurner and Poledna (2013), Bastos-Santos et al. (2010), Boss et al. (2004)
and Lorenz et al. (2009)
4For other examples of games played on networks, the reader is referred to Kearns (2007), Candogan
et al. (2012), Bloch and Querou (2013), Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), Ballester et al. (2009), Ambrus
et al. (2014) or Jackson and Zenou (2014). For some early work on the topic of vaccination in a fully mixing
population, see Francis (1997) or Brito et al. (1991).
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name a few important examples. Strategic decisions to invest in protection are based on an
agent’s intrinsic failure risk as well as on his belief about his neighbors and their probability
of failure. In a complex networked system, forming such a belief can be challenging. For
that reason, we study the problem with an infinite number of agents and employ a solution
concept that considerably simplifies how agents reason about the network: a mean-field
equilibrium (MFE). This is similar to the equilibrium concept used in Galeotti et al. (2010),
Jackson and Yariv (2007) and Leduc et al. (2015). An agent simply considers a mean-
field approximation of the cascading failure process. This equilibrium concept allows us to
preserve the heterogeneity of the networked interaction structure (each agent can have a
different degree, i.e. a different number of connections) while simplifying the computation of
an equilibrium. This mean-field equilibrium concept also conveniently allows for comparative
statics in terms of the network structure (as captured by the degree distribution), as well as
other model parameters. This allows us to measure such things as the effect of an increase
in the level of connectedness on investments in protection.
We characterize the equilibrium for two broad classes of games: (i) games of total pro-
tection, in which agents invest in protection against both their intrinsic failure risk and the
failure risk of their neighbors and (ii) games of self protection, in which agents invest in
protection only against their intrinsic failure risk. The first class defines a game of strategic
substitutes, in which some agents free-ride on the protection provided by others. Applica-
tions covered by this class of games include vaccination or computer security. The second
class defines a game of strategic complements, in which agents pool their investments in
protection and this can result in coordination failures. Applications covered by this class of
games include airport security.
Another of our contributions is to analyze the effect of the network structure on equilib-
rium behavior in those two classes of games. For example, in the case of vaccination, it is
the agents who have more neighbors than a certain threshold who choose to vaccinate and
the agents who are less connected who free-ride. The more connected agents thus bear the
burden of vaccination, which can be seen as a positive outcome. In the case of airport secu-
rity, on the other hand, it is agents who have fewer neighbors than a certain threshold who
choose to invest in security equipment/personnel. Since the less connected airports are less
likely to act as hubs that can transmit failures, this can be seen as an inefficient outcome.
To our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly characterize such features, which are the
consequence of network structure and can have important policy and welfare implications.
Finally, we study the case when the cost of protection depends on the global demand
for it. For example, the price of airport security equipment or computer security solutions
will increase if demand increases. It is important to understand the impact that this can
have on agent’s behavior as the introduction of such a global congestion externality may
conflict with the local (network-related) externalities. We characterize the equilibrium after
introducing this price feedback and show that the results derived previously still hold. In
other words, the results obtained solely with local, network-related externalities are robust
to introduction of such global effects. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study





Figure 1: Example of a Contagion Cascade: individuals labeled 1 and 2 contract the disease from exogenous
sources. From then on, a contagion cascade takes place in discrete steps: all their neighbors become infected.
This then leads to their neighbors’ neighbors to become infected and so on.
2. Cascading Failures in Networks
2.1. Overview
In this section we will discuss how cascades of failures can propagate through networks. A
cascade of failures is defined as a process involving the subsequent failures of interconnected
components. A failure is a general term that may represent different kinds of costly events.
Let us consider, for example, the spread of a disease in a human population. Initially,
some individuals get infected through exogenous sources such as livestock, mosquitos or the
mutation of a pathogen. These individuals can then transmit the disease through contacts
with other humans. Let us suppose that an individual is sure to catch the disease if one of
his neighbors is infected. Figure 1 illustrates this process. We can see the impact of network
structure on contagion. Some people lying in certain components remain healthy whereas
others are infected by their neighbors. We also see that individuals with a high number
of contacts tend to facilitate contagion. This is a simplified model of contagion. A more
realistic model could, for example, transmit the disease only to randomly selected neighbors,
depending on its virulence.
Now let us imagine that some individuals are vaccinated and therefore are not susceptible
to becoming infected, neither by exogenous sources nor by contacts with other people. This
will have an impact on the cascading process. Indeed, it will effectively ‘cut’ certain contagion
channels, thereby impeding the spread of the disease. Figure 2 illustrates this. We see that
the importance of the network structure becomes even more striking. In Fig. 2a), immunized
individuals have been selected randomly, whereas in Fig. 2b) individuals with 4 or more
contacts have been immunized. It is clear that those more connected individuals often
act as hubs through which contagion can spread more easily. When these individuals are
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immunized, the effect of impeding the propagation of the disease tends to be much greater
than when the immunized individuals are chosen at random.
In this example, the ‘failure’ of an individual means his becoming infected by the disease.
In other applications, ‘failure’ can mean infection by malware. The nodes then no longer
represent individuals but computers (or local subnetworks or autonomous systems). An-
tivirus software or other sorts of computer security solutions are means by which the spread
of malware can be impeded.
We saw in the simple example of Fig. 2 that the configuration of the vaccinated nodes
was crucial to impeding contagion. An important question is to study the incentives that
an individual may have to become vaccinated. How does the network structure affect his
decision to become vaccinated? What roles other individuals play in influencing that decision
through their own vaccination behavior?
Given the range of applications, we will talk of an investment in protection. This refers
to an investment made by a node in order to protect itself against the risk of failure. In
the next section, we build a model of strategic investment in protection against cascading
failures in networked systems. We will refer to nodes as agents, since they make decisions
regarding this investment in protection. More generally, we will be interested in how the
network structure and the failure propagation mechanism influence those decisions through
the externalities that they generate.
2.2. Network, Failure Mechanism and Basic Informational Assumptions
In this section, we briefly describe the finite interaction setting that we will later approx-
imate with a mean-field model.
There is a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The connections between them are
described by an undirected network that is represented by a symmetrical adjacency matrix
g ∈ {0, 1}n×n, with gij = 1 implying that i and j are connected. i can thus be affected by
the failure of j and vice versa. By convention, we set gii = 0 for all i ∈ N . The network
realization g is unobservable to the agents, but it is drawn from the probability measure
P : {0, 1}n×n → [0, 1] over the set of all possible networks with n nodes. We assume that P
is permutation-invariant, i.e. that changing node labels does not change the measure.
Each agent i has a neighborhood Ni(g) = {j|gij = 1}. The degree of agent i, di(g), is the
number of i’s connections, i.e. di(g) = |Ni(g)|.
We study an informational environment5 in which agents are aware of their proclivity
to interact with others, but do not know who these others will be when taking actions.
Formally, this means that an agent knows only his degree di. For example, a bank may have
a good idea of the number of financial counter-parties it has but not the number of counter-
parties the latter have, let alone the whole topology of the interbank system. Likewise,
someone may know the number of people he interacts with, but not the number of people
the latter interact with. An airport may know the number of connecting flights it has with
other airports, but not the number of connecting flights other airports have.
We now introduce two definitions that capture how agents reason about cascading fail-
ures.
5Such an environment is similar to the one presented in Galeotti et al. (2010).
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Figure 2: Examples of Contagion Cascades in the Presence of Immunized Individuals: individuals labeled 1
and 2 contract the disease from exogenous sources. The contagion cascade then propagates. In part (a), a
randomly-chosen subset of agents were vaccinated against the disease. In part (b), individuals with at least
4 contacts were vaccinated against the disease.
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Definition 1. An agent’s intrinsic failure probability is denoted by p ∈ [0, 1].
We assume all agents can fail intrinsically with the same probability p. The interpretation
of intrinsic failure depends on the application. In the context of malware, intrinsic failure
means a computer becoming infected as a result of a direct hacking attack. In the context of
the spread of contagious diseases, intrinsic failure means being infected by a virus through
non-human sources, such as contact with livestock or insects. In the context of airport
security, intrinsic failure can mean a suspicious luggage being checked in at the airport.
An agent can also fail as a result of the failure of his neighbors through a cascading failure
function defined below.
Definition 2. A cascading failure function Hd : {0, 1}d → [0, 1] for an agent of degree d
takes a d-dimensional vector ~αN(g) of binary variables, each representing the state (0 for
healthy or 1 for failed) of a neighbor, and returns the probability of failure of the agent.
Hd(~αN(g)) is assumed to be non-decreasing in each entry of the vector ~αN(g).
We assume that Hd is permutation invariant, so that if ~α′N(g) is a permutation of ~αN(g)
(both d-dimensional vectors), then Hd(~α′N(g)) = Hd(~αN(g)). Hd can be deterministic (in
which case Hd(~αN(g)) ∈ {0, 1}) or stochastic (in which case Hd(~αN(g)) ∈ [0, 1]). Note that
any two agents i and j of the same degree d have the same cascading failure function.
Thus an agent can either fail intrinsically (i.e. by himself) or as a result of the failures
of a subset of his neighbors. Those neighbors who have failed may have done so intrinsically
or as a result of the failure of a subset of their own neighbors.
2.3. Action Sets and Decision Time
In order to protect himself against the risk of failure, we allow an agent i to make a costly
investment in protection. This is a one-shot investment that can be made in anticipation
of a cascade of failures, which may take place in the future. This investment in protection
is represented by an action ai, which is part of a binary action set A = {0, 1}. The latter
represents the set of possible investments in protection against failure: ai = 1 means that
the agent invests in protection while ai = 0 means that the agent remains unprotected. In
an application to computer security, ai can represent an investment in computer security so-
lutions or anti-virus software. In applications to disease spread, ai can represent vaccination,
whereas in the case of airport security, ai can represent an investment in security personnel
or equipment. We assume throughout that A is the same for all agents. The exact effect of
this action on an agent’s actual failure risk will be formalized in Definition 5.
Note that this is a very convenient set-up in which to study strategic investments in
protection against cascading failures. Indeed, we reduce the problem to a static game,
in which agents simultaneously decide whether to invest in protection in anticipation of a
cascade of failures that may take place in the future. Thus ~αN(g) reflects the state of each
neighbor (‘failed’ or ‘healthy’) in steady state, when the cascade of failures has stabilized.
This is a credible context in which to study the applications mentioned earlier. For example,
flu vaccines tend to be taken once a year, in anticipation of a possible outbreak. Likewise,
investments in airport security or computer security are costly, long-term decisions that
are taken in anticipation of cascades of negative events. A static game, in which agents
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consider the steady state of a cascade of failures to estimate their own risk of failure, is thus
a convenient set up to study this problem.
Normally, we would be interested in finding a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this finite game.
This however requires an agent to hold fairly sophisticated beliefs about ~αN(g), the vector
of joint failures of his neighbors. An agent thus needs to formulate the joint probability
distribution function of ~αN(g) by combining the measure P from which the network is drawn
with the investments in protection made by other agents. This is highly non-trivial since,
for example, an agent’s neighbors may be interconnected and their failures may thus be
correlated. This is a common problem in such network games; see, e.g. Adlakha et al.
(2011), for models that face similar issues. In order to circumvent such complications and to
impose a more realistic cognitive burden on the agents, we will develop a mean-field model
as an approximation to this finite model. This is done the next section.
3. The Mean-Field Model
In this section, we develop a formal mean-field model as an approximation to the finite
interaction setting described in the previous section. Our mean-field model is developed in
two parts. First, we make two mean-field assumptions that simplify the decision problem
faced by a single agent. Given these two assumptions, we show that the optimal response
of an agent has a particularly simple structure. Next, we develop a consistency check:
namely, the mean-field assumptions should arise from the strategies that agents choose. This
combination of requirements—optimality and consistency—leads us to a formal definition of
mean-field equilibrium for our game.
We make two mean-field assumptions: one to simplify how an agent reasons about the
graph; and a second to simplify how an agent reasons about whether or not a neighbor will
fail. Throughout this section, since we deal with a single agent, we suppress the agent index
i.
First, since P is permutation invariant (cf. Section 2.2), we can define the degree dis-
tribution of P as the probability a node has degree d in a graph drawn according to P ;
we denote the degree distribution6 by f(d) for d ≥ 1. Note that we are not interested in
modeling agents of degree 0 (since they do not play a game) and we therefore always assume
that f(0) = 0. We assume a countably infinite set of agents. An agent’s degree d is drawn
according to the degree distribution f(d).
The first mean-field assumption formalizes the idea that agents reason about the graph
structure in a simple way through the degree distribution.
Mean-Field Assumption 1. Each agent conjectures that the degrees of his neighbors are
drawn i.i.d. according to the edge-perspective degree distribution f˜(d) = f(d)d∑
d≥1 f(d)d
.
The expression for f˜(d) in the above assumption follows from a standard calculation in
graph theory (see Jackson (2008) for more details). f˜(d) is the probability that a neighbor
6Throughout the chapter, we use the term degree distribution to mean degree density. When referring to
the cumulative distribution function (CDF), we will do so explicitly.
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has degree d. It therefore takes into account the fact that a higher-degree node has a higher
chance of being connected to any agent and thus of being his neighbor.
The second mean-field assumption addresses how an agent reasons about the failure
probability of his neighbors.
Mean-Field Assumption 2. Each agent conjectures that each of his neighbors fails with
probability α ∈ [0, 1], independently across neighbors.
In the mean-field setting, the computation of an agent’s expected cascading failure prob-
ability is considerably simplified. It can be directly defined in terms of α, as seen in the
following definition.
Definition 3. For any d, let the mapping qd : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] denote a degree-d agent’s mean-
field cascading failure probability, i.e. qd(α) is the probability that an agent of degree d will
fail as a result of a cascade of failures, given that his neighbors each fail independently with
probability α.
We make the following natural assumption.
Assumption 1. For any d, qd(α) is strictly increasing and continuous in α. Moreover, we
explicitly set q0(α) = 0 and thus an agent with no neighbors cannot fail as a result of a
cascade of failures.
The actual expression for qd(α) depends on the type of cascade we are considering. We
will consider only a situation when qd(α) is a non-decreasing function of d. In other words,
the cascading failure risk is higher when an agent has more connections.7
The mean-field framework allows us to make assumptions directly on qd(α) instead of
making them on the actual failure mechanism Hd, defined in Section 2.2. We now give some
examples.
3.0.1. Example 1
(Malware or virus spread) Let a computer be infected by a direct hacking attack with
probability p. Assume that malware8 (i.e. computer viruses) can spread from computer to
computer according to a general contact process: if a neighbor is infected, then the computer
will be infected with probability r. Then qd(α) = 1 − (1 − rα)d. Indeed, each neighbor is
infected with probability α and this infection spreads independently across each edge with
probability r. This contact process can also serve as a model for the spread of viruses among
human populations. Note that the parameter r models the virulence or infectiousness of the
process: given that a neighbor is infected, r is the probability9 that he will infect the agent.
7In the appendix, we also study the case where qd(α) is a decreasing function of d. This can model a
form of diversification of failure risk across neighbors.
8For models developed specifically for malware, see Lelarge and Bolot (2008b), Lelarge and Bolot (2008a)
or Lelarge and Bolot (2009).
9In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, r was assumed to be 1 for simplicity of exposure.
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3.0.2. Example 2
(Airport security risk) The contact process of Example 1 can also be applied to airport
security, where failure can mean a security event, i.e. a failure to stop a suspicious luggage
from getting on a flight. The agents represent airports, and the edges linking them represent
flights. The suspicious luggage can then cascade, i.e. travel to one or more other airports,
exposing them to security events.
In the next two sections we develop both the optimal response of an agent to the envi-
ronment described by the mean-field assumptions, as well as the consistency check that α
should satisfy given the strategic choices of the agents.
3.1. Optimal Response
Again, we assume a binary action set A = {0, 1}, where a = 1 means an investment
in protection against failure while a = 0 means no investment in protection against failure.
Since an agent of degree d either fails intrinsically with probability p or in a cascade with
probability qd, we can define his total probability of failure as follows.
Definition 4 (Total probability of failure). The total probability of failure of an agent of
degree d is
βd = p+ (1− p)qd (1)
We study a static setting, in which agents make decisions simultaneously, in anticipation
of a cascade of failures that may happen in the future. Therefore each agent is in state
healthy when he chooses an action a ∈ A representing a costly investment in protection
against failure. We now describe how this action affects an agent’s failure probability.
Definition 5. Let the mapping B : [0, 1] × [0, 1] × A → [0, 1] denote the effective failure
probability of an agent. We assume that B(p, qd, a) is continuous in all arguments, increasing
in p, linear and increasing in qd and that it is decreasing and convex in a.
Thus, B(p, qd, a) is the total failure probability of an agent (defined in (1)) when he has
invested a in protection against failure. Note that this definition allows this action to operate
separately on p and qd, as will be seen in Section 4. We can now state an agent’s expected
utility function, which will capture his decision problem.
Definition 6. A mean-field strategy µ : N+ → [0, 1] is a scalar-valued function that specifies,
for every d > 0, the probability that an agent of degree d invests in protection. We denote
by M the set of all mean-field strategies.
Note that M = [0, 1]∞, the space of [0, 1]-valued sequences. Throughout, we endow M
with the product topology and [0, 1] with the Euclidean topology.
A degree-d agent’s expected utility function is now given by
Ud(a, α) = −V · B(p, qd(α), a)− C · a (2)
where C > 0 is the cost of investing in protection, V > 0 is the value that is lost in the event
of failure and B(·, ·, ·) is the expected effective failure probability (cf. Definition 5).
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This utility function thus captures the tradeoff between the expected loss V · B(p, qd, a)
and the cost10 C of investing in protection. Notice again that an agent’s expected utility
depends on the actions of others only through the cascading failure probability qd(α), since
they will affect the probability of failure α of a randomly-picked neighbor. Note also that the
expected utility function Ud(·, ·) depends on the agent’s degree d but not on his identity i.
Therefore, any two agents i and j who have the same degree have the same utility function.
From the assumptions on B, Ud is continuous in all arguments and concave in a. An agent is
risk-neutral and will thus maximize this expected utility function by choosing the appropriate
action a.
It is now straightforward to solve for the optimal strategy of an agent of degree d: an
agent invests in protection, does not invest, or is indifferent if Ud(1, α) is greater than, less
than, or equal to Ud(0, α), respectively. We thus have the following definition.
Definition 7. Let Sd(α) ⊂ [0, 1] denote the set of optimal responses for a degree-d agent
given α; i.e.:
Ud(1, α) > Ud(0, α) =⇒ Sd(α) = {1};
Ud(1, α) < Ud(0, α) =⇒ Sd(α) = {0};
Ud(1, α) = Ud(0, α) =⇒ Sd(α) = [0, 1].





Note that at least one optimal response always exists and is essentially uniquely defined,
except at those degrees where an agent is indifferent.
3.2. Consistency
We will now develop a consistency check that guarantees that a randomly-picked neigh-
bor’s failure probability α is consistent with the mean-field strategy µ played by the popu-
lation.
Definition 8. Let the function T :M→ [0, 1] be defined as
T (µ) = {α : F(µ, α) = α} (3)




f˜(d)B(p, qd−1(α), µ(d)) (4)
10The cost of investing in protection may represent the price of airport security equipment or computer
security solutions. It may also represent the possible side-effects that may be associated with a vaccine (e.g.
The Economist (4 February 2015)).
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In the above definition, T (µ) represents the mean-field failure probability of a randomly-
picked neighbor, given that strategy µ is played by other agents. It is important to note
that for some µ, T (µ) is a fixed-point of F(µ, α) in α. F(µ, α) is the failure probability
of a randomly-picked neighbor given that agents play strategy µ and this neighbor’s other
neighbors fail with probability α. A fixed point α = F(µ, α) ensures that α is the same
across all agents.
Note that an agent does not internalize the effect of his own failure on others when
forming his belief about the failure risk of a neighbor. Hence the presence of qd−1(α) on
the right-hand side of (4) instead of qd(α): the cascading failure risk of a given neighbor of
degree d is only due to his d− 1 other neighbors.
To guarantee that T (µ) is unique (i.e. that (4) has a unique fixed point), we make the
following assumption on F(µ, α):
Assumption 2. For any µ ∈M, F(µ, α) has a unique fixed point in α.
Note that Assumption 2 is not particularly stringent. This is easy to verify in the contact
process models of Example 1 and Example 2.
3.3. Mean-Field Equilibrium
We now formally define the equilibrium concept and state our first theorem.
Definition 9 (Mean-field equilibrium). A mean-field strategy µ∗ constitutes a mean-field
equilibrium (MFE) if µ∗ ∈ S(T (µ∗)).
This equilibrium definition ensures that the mean-field assumptions arise from the opti-
mal strategies chosen by agents. Also note that to any MFE µ∗, there corresponds a unique
equilibrium neighbor failure probability α∗ = T (µ∗).
Theorem 1 (Existence). There exists a mean-field equilibrium.
The computation of this equilibrium is considerably simpler than the computation of a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a finite game. In fact, α∗ is obtained from a one-dimensional fixed-
point equation resulting from the composition of T and S, i.e. α∗ = T (S(α∗)). µ∗ is then
found from the map S(α∗) (cf. Definition 7). In the finite game with n agents, µ would be a
(n − 1)-dimensional object and so would the equilibrium fixed-point condition11. However,
it is worth mentioning that existence no longer follows from a standard Nash argument as
it would in a finite game, since we now have a countably infinite set of agents. Theorem 1 is
thus a non-trivial result.
4. Characterizing MFE
In this section, we will study two classes of games in which agents make decisions to invest
in protection. We will start with games of total protection, in which an agent’s investment
decreases his total risk of failure. We will then proceed with games of self protection, in
which an agent’s investment in protection only protects him against his own intrinsic risk of
failure.
11The reader is referred to Chapter 3 of Leduc (2014) for a more detailed treatment of this finite game.
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4.1. Games of Total Protection
We start with the following definition.
Definition 10 (Games of total protection). In a game of total protection, the mean-field
effective failure probability has the following form




· (1− ka) (5)








· (1− kµ(d)) (6)
In games of total protection, as can be seen in (5), an agent’s investment in protection
decreases his total probability of failure p + (1 − p)qd(α). The parameter k governs the
effectiveness of the investment in protection. The higher k, the more an investment in
protection reduces the failure probability.
Examples of models covered by this class are malware and the investment in anti-virus or
computer security solutions or the spread of contagious diseases and the decision to vaccinate.
The action protects both against the intrinsic failure risk and the cascading failure risk.
Vaccination, for example, protects against both the risk of being infected by non-human and
human sources. It is also the case for standard anti-virus software, which protects against
the risk of being infected by malware through connections with other computers.
Games of total protection are submodular. In other words, they are of strategic substitutes:
the more other agents invest in protection (the lower α), the less an agent has an incentive to
invest in protection. A nice property of games of total protection is that they have a unique
equilibrium. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). In a game of total protection, the mean-field equilibrium µ∗ is
unique.
To further characterize the nature of this equilibrium, we introduce some definitions.
Definition 11 (Upper-threshold strategy). A mean-field strategy µ is an upper-threshold
strategy if there exists dU ∈ N+
⋃{∞}, such that:
d < dU =⇒ µ(d) = 0;
d > dU =⇒ µ(d) = 1.
Thus, under an upper-threshold strategy, agents with degrees above a certain threshold
invest in protection whereas agents with degrees below that threshold do not invest.
Definition 12 (Lower-threshold strategy). A mean-field strategy µ is a lower-threshold strat-
egy if there exists dL ∈ N+
⋃{∞}, such that:
d > dL =⇒ µ(d) = 0;
d < dL =⇒ µ(d) = 1.
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Likewise, under a lower-threshold strategy, agents with degrees below a certain threshold
invest in protection whereas agents with degrees above that threshold do not invest.
Note that the definitions above do not place any restriction on the strategies at the
thresholds dL and dU themselves; we allow randomization at these thresholds. The next
result shows that any equilibrium can be characterized by a threshold strategy.
Theorem 3. In a game of total protection, the unique MFE µ∗ is an upper-threshold equi-
librium. That is, µ∗ is an upper-threshold mean-field strategy.
The intuition behind this result is that, higher-degree agents are more exposed to cascad-
ing failures than lower-degree agents, thus making an investment in total protection relatively
more rewarding.
The implications of this theorem are important as higher-degree agents are more central.
Indeed, in a mean-field interaction setting, degree centrality is an appropriate measure of
centrality. This result can thus be seen as a satisfactory outcome since more central agents
have higher incentives to internalize the risk they impose on the system. In equilibrium, the
total cost of protection is thus born by those who have a maximal effect on decreasing α =
T (µ). For example, in the case of malware, agents with a higher level of interaction (higher
degree) have a higher incentive to invest in computer security (i.e. anti-virus software). The
same principle applies in the case of human-born viruses: individuals who interact more have
a higher incentive to get vaccinated.
4.1.1. Comparing MFE to Nash equilibrium
We compare the equilibrium outcome in the mean-field setting analyzed so far with the
equilibrium outcomes in a finite model, where agents have full knowledge of the network
topology. We will see that the mean-field model allows for the advantage of selecting a
unique equilibrium outcome and of eliminating implausible equilibria that could arise under
full information. In Fig. 3, we illustrate the difference between the MFE and Nash equilibria
in the particular cases of star and circular networks.12 In Fig. 3a), we can see that on a
star network, there is a unique upper-threshold MFE, in which the center agent invests in
protection while the periphery agents free ride. This is because the higher-degree agent is
exposed to the potential failure of four neighbors, whereas the periphery agents are exposed
to the failure of only one neighbor. In Fig. 3b), on the other hand, we see that there
are many possible Nash equilibria that do not depend on an agent’s degree, but rather on
an agent’s particular position in the network. We include two of them: one in which the
periphery agents free ride and one in which the center agent free rides. In the case of a
circular network, we see in Fig. 3c) that the unique MFE is a symmetric mixed strategy. In
fact all agents have degree 2 and thus are exposed to the same ex-ante cascade risk. They
therefore all play the same mixed strategy. In Fig. 3d), on the other hand, we see that there
are again multiple Nash equilibria that do not depend on an agent’s degree, but rather on
an agent’s particular position in the network. These different Nash equilibria do not have a
meaningful difference, but add to the complexity of the equilibrium set. In fact, computing
12The mean-field model assumes a countably infinite number of agents, but it is still useful to analyze the
behavior of MFEs on finite star and circular networks, as in Figs. 3 and 4. Those stars and circles can be
understood as smaller components of a larger, possibly infinite network.
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Invest, ai=1 Not invest, ai=0 Mixed strategy
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Comparison of MFE and Nash Equilibria in a Game of Total Protection on Star and Circular
Networks. The cascade process is assumed to follow a contact process as in Example 1. Model parameters
are C = 0.6, k = 1, r = 1, p = 0.5. For the star network, the neighbor degree distribution is assumed to
be f˜(1) = 0.5 and f˜(4) = 0.5. For the circular networks, the neighbor degree distribution is assumed to be
f˜(2) = 1. (a) shows the unique MFE on a star network. (b) shows two of the possible Nash equilibria on a
star network. (c) shows the unique MFE on a circular network. (d) shows two of the possible Nash equilibria
on a circular network.
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Nash equilibria on a network with full information can pose computational challenges (see
for example, Kearns (2007)).
In the next section, we study the other class of games: Games of self protection.
4.2. Games of Self Protection
We start with the following definition.
Definition 13 (Games of self protection). In a game of self protection, the mean-field ef-
fective failure probability has the following form
B(p, qd(α), a) = p · (1− ka) + (1− p · (1− ka)) · qd(α) (7)






p · (1− kµ(d)) + (1− p · (1− kµ(d))) · qd−1(α)) (8)
In games of self protection, as can be seen in (7), an agent’s investment in protection
only decreases his intrinsic probability of failure p. It has no effect on his cascading failure
probability qd(α). Again, the parameter k governs the effectiveness of the investment in
protection corresponding to the action a.
Examples of applications covered by this class of games include airport security when
luggage/passengers are only scanned at the originating airport. Airports then otherwise rely
on each other’s provision of security for transiting passengers/luggage.
Games of self protection are supermodular. In other words, they are of strategic comple-
ments: the more other agents invest in protection (the lower α), the more an agent has an
incentive to invest in protection. Since games of self protection are effectively coordination
games, there can be multiple equilibria. The next result shows that any equilibrium can be
characterized by a threshold strategy. Moreover, the thresholds are reversed when compared
to games total protection (cf. Theorem 3).
Theorem 4. In a game of self protection, any MFE µ∗ is a lower-threshold equilibrium.
That is, µ∗ is a lower-threshold mean-field strategy.
Higher cascade risk thus leads to lower incentives to invest in protection. This is because
an agent remains exposed to the failure risk of others irrespectively of whether she invests
in protection. An investment in protection thus has lower returns as the cascading failure
risk increases. An agent’s cascading failure risk increases in degree, and thus higher-degree
agents invest less in protection than lower-degree agents. The intuition is that higher-degree
agents are more exposed to cascading failure risk than lower-degree agents, thus making an
investment in their own self protection relatively less rewarding.
The fact that, in games of self-protection, the incentives are reversed has important im-
plications. In fact, the more central (higher-degree) agents have a lesser incentive to invest
in protection even though they are more vulnerable and more dangerous, i.e. they are hubs
through which cascading failures can spread. More central agents thus have lower incentives
to internalize the risk they impose on the system, pointing to an inefficient outcome. More-
over, in equilibrium, the total cost of protection is born by lower-degree agents: those who
have the smallest effect on decreasing α = T (µ).
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For example, in the model of airport security risk described in Example 2, an airport
that interacts with a high number of other airports has smaller incentives to invest in its
own security, since it remains exposed to a high risk of being hit by an event coming from a
connecting flight. This, as before, is assuming that the passengers/luggage are only inspected
at their point of origin and not at points of transit. The next proposition formalizes this
implication by stating that, in equilibrium, the failure risk of an agent is monotone in degree.
Proposition 1 (Risk). Let ad ∈ µ∗(d). In a game of self protection the equilibrium mean-
field effective failure probability B(p, qd(α∗), ad) is non-decreasing in d.
The next result is also a consequence of the monotonicity of equilibrium strategies stated
in Theorem 4.
Proposition 2 (Welfare I). Let ad ∈ µ∗(d). In a game of self protection, the equilibrium
expected utility Ud(ad, α
∗) is non-increasing in d.
In games of self-protection, agents effectively pool their investments in protection and,
as said earlier, there can be multiple equilibria. These equilibria can however be ordered by
level of investment. Suppose there are m possible equilibria. Then, they can be ordered in
the following way
µ∗1  µ∗2  ...  µ∗m.
Since (8) is decreasing in µ, it follows that α∗1 ≥ α∗2... ≥ α∗m.
We then have a second welfare result.
Proposition 3 (Welfare II). In a game of self protection, let µ∗k  µ∗l be two equilibria
ordered by level of investment. Then µ∗l weakly Pareto-dominates µ
∗
k.
This result is not trivial. It effectively states that in the high investment equilibrium, the
decrease in risk resulting from higher investments outweighs the cost of those investments.
This is due to the positive externality stemming from the effect of pooled investments in
protection, which reduce all agents’ failure risk.
We can focus our attention on the minimum-investment equilibrium (µ∗, α¯∗) and the
maximum-investment equilibrium (µ¯∗, α∗). In the former, α¯∗ = T (µ∗) is actually maximal
since agents invest least, while in the latter, α∗ = T (µ¯∗) is actually minimal since agents
invest most. From Proposition 3, agents playing the minimum-investment equilibrium can
be thus considered a coordination failure.
4.2.1. Comparing MFE to Nash equilibrium
We again compare the equilibrium outcomes in the mean-field setting with the equilibrium
outcomes in a finite model, where agents have full knowledge of the network topology. In
Fig. 4, we illustrate the difference between MFE and Nash equilibria in the particular
case of a star network. In Fig. 4a), we see that there are three possible MFE’s: a low-
investment equilibrium, in which nobody invests in protection; an intermediate-investment
equilibrium, in which the center agent does not invest while the periphery agents invest; and
a high-investment equilibrium, in which all agents invest. All equilibria are lower-threshold
strategies (the first and third ones being trivially so). Since from Proposition 3, a lower-
investment equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a higher-investment equilibrium, the first
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Invest, ai=1 Not invest, ai=0
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Comparison of MFE and Nash Equilibria in a Game of Self Protection on Star Networks. The
cascade process is assumed to follow a contact process as in Example 1. Model parameters are C = 0.4,
k = 1, r = 1, p = 0.5. The neighbor degree distribution is assumed to be f˜(1) = 0.86 and f˜(4) = 0.14. (a)
shows the three MFEs. (b) shows the two pure strategy Nash equilibria.
two equilibria can be regarded as coordination failures. In Fig. 4b), we see that there are
two pure strategy Nash equilibria corresponding to the no-investment equilibrium and the
full-investment equilibrium. Again, we see that equilibrium behavior is not related to an
agent’s degree.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate Theorems 3 and 4 on a complex network. We see how the upper
(resp. lower) threshold nature of MFE’s in games of total (resp. self) protection affects the
spread of cascading failures differently.
4.3. Comparative Statics
An advantage of the mean-field setting is that we can relate equilibrium behavior to
network properties as captured by the edge-perspective degree distribution f˜(d). We can
then ask questions such as “does a higher level of connectedness13 increase or decrease the
incentives to invest in protection?” This is examined in the next two propositions.
Proposition 4. Let µ∗ and µ¯∗ be the minimum- and maximum-investment equilibria in a
game of self protection, when the edge-perspective degree distribution is f˜ . Then, a first-order
distributional shift f˜ ′  f˜ results in µ′∗  µ∗ and µ¯′∗  µ¯∗ and thus in α¯′∗ ≥ α¯∗ and α′∗ ≥ α∗.
Thus in a game of self protection, a higher level of connectedness leads to lower incentives
to invest in protection: each of the new maximum- and minimum-investment equilibria
are weakly dominated by the corresponding equilibria in the less connected network. The
intuition behind this result is that an agent is more likely to be connected to a high-degree
neighbor (high-risk and unprotected). This increases the agent’s cascading failure risk and
therefore lowers the incentive to invest in self protection. We note that in equilibrium, the
corresponding neighbor failure probabilities are larger, i.e. α¯′∗ ≥ α¯∗ and α′∗ ≥ α∗.
When cascading failures follow a contact process as in Example 1 (cf. Section 3), it is
interesting to study the effect of a change in the infectiousness parameter r on mean-field
equilibria. The following two propositions illustrate that a change in r has opposite effects,
depending on whether the game is one of self protection or total protection.
13Note that by a higher level of connectedness, we mean an edge-perspective degree distribution placing





Infected Healthy, not immunized Healthy, immunized
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Illustration of Theorems 3 and 4 on a complex network with the cascading process of Fig. 1:
possible equilibrium strategies in (a) a game of total protection and (b) a game of self protection. In (a), we
see that the upper-threshold strategy insulates contagion hubs whereas in (b) we see that the lower-threshold
strategy insulates periphery nodes and leaves contagion hubs vulnerable.
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Proposition 5. Let µ∗ and µ¯∗ be the minimum- and maximum-investment equilibria in a
game of self protection with cascading failures following a contact process with infectiousness
parameter r, as in Example 1. Then, r′ > r results in µ′∗  µ∗ and µ¯′∗  µ¯∗ and thus in
α¯′∗ ≥ α¯∗ and α′∗ ≥ α∗.
Thus in a game of self protection, when cascading failures follow a contact process as in
Example 1, a higher level of infectiousness creates lower incentives for agents to invest in
protection: the initial increase in α caused by higher infectiousness causes an even greater
increase in α as a result of strategic interactions. The situation is very different in a game
of total protection, as shown in the next result.
Proposition 6. Let µ∗ be the unique equilibrium in a game of total protection with cascading
failures following a contact process with infectiousness parameter r, as in Example 1. Then,
an increase r′ > r in infectiousness results in an equilibrium µ′∗ with µ′∗  µ∗ and r′α′∗ ≥
rα∗.
In a game of total protection, a higher level of infectiousness creates higher incentives
for agents to invest in protection. This investment in protection is however not enough
to counter the increase in rα caused by a higher level of infectiousness. This is because
agents free-ride on the protection provided by others and thus an increase in rα cannot be
completely compensated. The next result examines the effect of an increase in the parameter
k, which governs the extent of the protection resulting from an investment.
Proposition 7. Let µ∗ and µ¯∗ be the minimum- and maximum-investment equilibria in a
game of self protection with parameter k. Then, k′ > k results in µ′∗  µ∗ and µ¯′∗  µ¯∗ and
thus in α¯′∗ ≤ α¯∗ and α′∗ ≤ α∗.
Thus in a game of self protection, an increase in the protection associated with an in-
vestment results in a higher investment.
4.4. Effect of Global Feedback
We have only examined the case where the only network effect is of a local nature.
That is, a utility function depends on others only through the failure probability of one’s
neighbors. In reality, global effects might also influence an agent’s utility. For instance, prices
of vaccines, computer security solutions or airport security equipment might be affected by
the global demand for them. Likewise, if protection is provided under the form of insurance14,
the insurance premium might depend on the overall failure level in the population, which
itself depends on the overall level of investment in protection.
In this section, we introduce such global effects to the model developed in the previous
sections. We focus on global feedback through the cost of protection, which can take the
form of a price to be paid.
We will introduce the following function, which maps a mean-field strategy µ to the
corresponding probability that a randomly-picked agent invests in protection:
14See, for example, Reuters (12 October 2015): ”Cyber insurance premiums rocket after high-profile
attacks”. Oct 12, 2015. Reuters. The reader may also see Johnson et al. (2011) and Lelarge and Bolot
(2009) for some work on insurance provision.
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Thus to each mean-field strategy µ corresponds a fraction ω =W(µ) of agents who invest
in protection. Furthermore, it is easy to notice that this function W increases in µ.
4.4.1. Global Feedback Through Price
We will explore the set up in which the cost of protection is influenced by the global de-
mand for it. Namely, when the cost of protection depends monotonically on total demand:
Cg = C · g(ω), where g(·) is either an increasing or decreasing continuous function of the
total fraction of people ω =W(µ) willing to invest in protection. In the following examples,
we outline two situations that can be modeled by the function g(·).
Example 1 (g(·) increasing). This case corresponds to the situation where the product is
scarce or there are global congestion effects. For instance, a vaccine might be produced in
limited quantity and thus, the more people demand it, the harder it may be to obtain it,
which will have an increasing effect on price.
Example 2 (g(·) decreasing). This corresponds to the case of economies of scale. For in-
stance, a new airport security technology might require significant initial R & D investments.
Producing it in large numbers may thus lead to a lower cost per unit, which may lower the
price.
We will slightly modify a degree-d agent’s expected utility function in order to introduce
the global feedback effect:
Ud(a, α, ω) = −V · B(p, qd(α), a)− C · g(ω) · a (10)
Note that the mean-field cascading failure probability qd(α) does not depend explicitly on
the global fraction of agents who invest in protection, as it is solely driven by local effects.
It is also important to mention that the introduction of a global externality does not affect
T (µ), as defined earlier in (3). The latter function was defined to be the failure probability
α of a randomly-picked neighbor, which does not depend explicitly on the total fraction of
agents investing in protection ω.
We will now modify the optimality condition in order to ensure that this fraction ω arises
in equilibrium. We can redefine the set of optimal responses as follows:
Definition 15. Let Sd(α, ω) ⊂ [0, 1] denote the set of optimal responses for a degree-d agent
given α and ω; i.e.:
Ud(1, α, ω) > Ud(0, α, ω) =⇒ Sd(α, ω) = {1};
Ud(1, α, ω) < Ud(0, α, ω) =⇒ Sd(α, ω) = {0};
Ud(1, α, ω) = Ud(0, α, ω) =⇒ Sd(α, ω) = [0, 1].
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We now only need to slightly modify the equilibrium condition:
Definition 16 (Mean-field equilibrium with global effects). A mean-field strategy µ∗ consti-
tutes a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) if µ∗ ∈ S(T (µ∗),W(µ∗)).
4.4.2. Equilibrium Characterization with Global Feedback
It turns out that under both global and local network effects, the main results that were
stated in the previous sections of the paper still hold. We thus state the following more
general existence result.
Theorem 5 (Existence). There exists a mean-field equilibrium in the game with global price
feedback.
Under both global and local externalities, the equilibrium condition now involves a two-
dimensional fixed-point equation (in α and ω), as opposed to a one-dimensional fixed point
in α only (cf. Section 3.3). Moreover, it turns out that the threshold nature of the equilibria,
derived earlier in the paper (cf. Theorems 3 and 4), still holds in the presence of a global
externality. This more general result is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Threshold Strategies). The threshold characterization of equilibria is robust to
the introduction of a global price feedback. In the presence of both global and local externali-
ties, the equilibrium is of: (1) an upper-threshold nature for a game of total protection; (2)
a lower-threshold nature for a game of self protection.
Moreover, it turns out that the equilibrium uniqueness result for games of total protection
(cf. Theorem 2) also holds, provided that g(·) is increasing. This is formalized below.
Theorem 7 (Uniqueness). In a game of total protection with global price feedback, the mean-
field equilibrium µ∗ is unique if g(·) is an increasing function.
As before, there can be multiple equilibria for games of self protection.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a framework to study the strategic investment in protection
against cascading failures in networked systems. Agents connected through a network can fail
either intrinsically or as a result of a cascade of failures which may cause their neighbors to
fail. To impose a realistic cognitive burden on agents and to ease the computation and char-
acterization of equilibria, we developed a mean-field model in which agents choose whether
to invest in costly protection against failure. The assumption of independence across neigh-
bors (local tree-like independence) allows for a tractable way to express an agent’s expected
cascading failure probability.
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We studied two broad classes of games covering a wide range of applications. We showed
that equilibrium strategies are monotone in degree (i.e. in the number of neighbors an
agent has on the network) and that this monotonicity is reversed depending on whether (i)
an investment in protection insulates an agent against the risk of failure of his neighbors
(games of total protection) or (ii) only against his own intrinsic risk of failure (games of
self protection). The first case covers the important examples of vaccination and computer
security solutions, in which it is the more connected agents who have higher incentives to
invest in protection. The second case, on the other hand, covers airport security, in which it
is the less connected agents who have higher incentives to invest in protection. Our analysis
reveals that it is the nature of strategic interactions (strategic substitutes/complements),
combined with a network structure that leads to such strikingly different equilibrium behavior
in each case, with important implications for the system’s resilience to cascading failures.
More generally, the research presented in this paper contributes to advancing the work
on systemic risk that involves strategic decisions within a networked system of agents. The
current literature is generally descriptive and most often does not involve strategic decisions
on the part of the agents.
Appendix A. Extensions
Appendix A.1. Continuous Action Sets
We have dealt with a binary action set A = {0, 1}. It is however straightforward to
extend our analysis to continuous action sets, e.g. A = [0, 1]. This can model an investment
in security that decreases the risk of failure in a proportional manner. All the monotonicity
results expressed in the paper hold in such a setting as well.
Appendix B. Proofs
Theorem 1. Note that we endow [0, 1] with the Euclidean topology.
For any α ∈ [0, 1] define the correspondence Φ by Φ(α) = T (S(α)). Any fixed point
α∗ of Φ, with the corresponding µ∗ ∈ S(α∗) such that T (µ∗) = α∗ constitute a MFE. We
thus need to show that the correspondence Φ has a fixed point. We employ Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem on the composite map Φ(α) = T (S(α)).
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem requires that Φ have a compact domain, which is trivial
since [0, 1] is compact. Further, Φ(α) must be nonempty; again, this is straightforward, since
both S and T have nonempty image.
Next, we show that Φ(α) has a closed graph. We first show that S has a closed graph,
when we endow the set of mean-field strategies with the product topology on [0, 1]∞. This
follows easily: if αn → α, and µn → µ, where µn ∈ S(αn) for all n, then µn(d)→ µ(d) for all
d. Since Ud(1, α) and Ud(0, α) are continuous, it follows that µ(d) ∈ Sd(α), so S has a closed
graph. Note also that with the product topology on the space of mean-field strategies, T is
continuous: if µn → µ, then T (µn)→ T (µ) by the bounded convergence theorem.
To complete the proof that Φ has a closed graph, suppose that αn → α, and that
α′n → α′, where α′n ∈ Φ(αn) for all n. Choose µn ∈ S(αn) such that T (µn) = α′n for all n.
By Tychonoff’s theorem, [0, 1]∞ is compact in the product topology; so taking subsequences
if necessary, we can assume that µn converges to a limit µ. Since S has a closed graph, we
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know µ ∈ S(α). Finally, since T is continuous, we know that T (µ) = α′. Thus α′ ∈ Φ(α),
as required.
Finally, we show that the image of Φ is convex. Let α1, α2 ∈ Φ(α) , and choose µ1, µ2 ∈
S(α) such that α1 = T (µ1) and α2 = T (µ2). Since F is continuous in µ and since T is
unique (this follows from Assumption 2), then T is continuous in µ. Now since S(α) is
convex, it follows that for any δ ∈ (0, 1),






and thus δα1 + (1− δ)α2 ∈ Φ(α)—as required.
By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Φ possesses a fixed point α∗. Letting µ∗ ∈ S(α∗) be
such that T (µ∗) = α∗, we conclude that µ∗ is an MFE.
Theorem 2. Consider the incremental expected utility for an agent of degree d, i.e.
∆Ud(α) = Ud(1, α)− Ud(0, α) (B.1)






We prove the theorem in a sequence of steps:
Step 1: For all d ≥ 1, ∆Ud(α) is strictly increasing in α ∈ [0, 1]. This follows directly
from Assumption 1.
Step 2: For all d ≥ 1, and α′ > α, Sd(α′)  Sd(α).15 This follows immediately from Step
1 and the definition of Sd in Definition 7.
Step 3: If µ′, µ are mean-field strategies such that µ′(d) ≥ µ(d), then T (µ′) ≤ T (µ).
This follows from the fact that F(µ, α) (cf. (6) in Definition 10) is non-increasing in µ and
that it is also continuous in both µ and α. Thus the unique fixed point α¯ = F(µ, α¯) is
non-increasing in µ. Therefore, T (µ′) ≤ T (µ).
Step 4: Completing the proof. So now suppose that there are two mean-field equilibria
(µ∗, α∗) and (µ′∗, α′∗), with α′∗ > α∗. By Step 2, since µ∗ ∈ S(α∗) and µ′∗ ∈ S(α′∗), we have
µ′∗(d) ≥ µ∗(d). By Step 3, we have α∗ = T (µ∗) ≥ T (µ′∗) = α′∗, a contradiction. Thus the
α∗ in any MFE must be unique, as required.
It then follows from the threshold nature of the equilibrium strategy µ∗ (cf. Theorem 3)
that to α∗, there corresponds a unique µ∗ ∈ S(α∗) such that α∗ = T (µ∗).
Theorem 3. Consider now, ∆Ud(α) as a function of the continuous variable d over the con-
nected support [1,∞). From (B.1), we can write





When qd(α) is non-decreasing in d, for any α ∈ (0, 1), ∆Ud(α) is a non-decreasing function
of d. It follows that the inverse image of (−∞, 0) is ∅ if ∆U1(α) > 0 or an interval [1, x)
15Here the set relation A  B means that for all x ∈ A and y ∈ B, x ≤ y.
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where x ≥ 1 otherwise. The integers in such intervals (i.e. ∅⋂N+ or [1, x)⋂N+) represent
the degrees of agents for whom not investing in protection is a strict best response, i.e.
{d : Sd(α) = {0}}. It follows that the degrees of agents for whom investing in protection is
a strict best response (i.e. {d : Sd(α) = {1}}) are located at the rightmost extremity of the
degree support.
Thus we may write µ(d) = 1, for all d > dU and µ(d) = 0, for all d < dU . This is
valid for any best-responding strategy µ and it is therefore valid for the equilibrium strategy
µ∗.
Theorem 4. In a game of self protection, consider now ∆Ud(α) as a function of the continuous
variable d over the connected support [1,∞). From (7) and (2), we can write
∆Ud(α) = Ud(1, α)− Ud(0, α)
= −V · (p(1− k) + (1− p(1− k))qd(α))− C + V · (p+ (1− p)qd(α))
= V · (pk − pkqd(α))− C
When qd(α) is non-decreasing in d, for any α ∈ (0, 1), ∆Ud(α) is a non-increasing function
of d. It follows that the inverse image of (−∞, 0) is an interval [1,∞) if ∆U1(α) < 0 or an
interval (x,∞) where x ≥ 1 otherwise. The integers in such intervals (i.e. [1,∞)⋂N+
or (x,∞)⋂N+) represent the degrees of agents for whom not investing in protection is a
strict best response, i.e. {d : Sd(α) = {0}}. It follows that the degrees of agents for whom
investing in protection is a strict best response (i.e. {d : Sd(α) = {1}}) are located at the
leftmost extremity of the degree support.
Thus we may write µ(d) = 1, for all d < dL and µ(d) = 0, for all d > dL. This is valid for
any best-responding strategy µ and it is therefore valid for the equilibrium strategy µ∗.
Proposition 1. From Theorem 4, when qd(α) is non-decreasing in d, the equilibrium strategy
µ∗ is non-increasing in d and qd(α∗) is non-decreasing in d. From (7), it thus follows that for
ad ∈ µ∗(d), B(p, qd(α∗), ad) is non-decreasing in d (since B is non-decreasing in qd(α∗) and
non-increasing in ad).
Proposition 2. Note that from Theorem 4, qd(α
∗) is non-decreasing in d. Thus for d′ > d,
ad′ ∈ µ∗(d′) and ad ∈ µ∗(d), we have
Ud(ad, α
∗) ≥ Ud(ad′ , α∗) ≥ Ud′(ad′ , α∗) (B.2)
where the first inequality follows from ad ∈ µ∗(d), while the second inequality follows from
qd(α
∗) being non-decreasing in d. Thus Ud(ad, α∗) is non-increasing in d.
Proposition 3. Let µ∗l ∈ S(α∗l ) and µ∗k ∈ S(α∗k). Then for any d,
Ud(al, α
∗
l ) ≥ Ud(ak, α∗l ) ≥ Ud(ak, α∗k) (B.3)
where al ∈ µ∗l (d) and ak ∈ µ∗k(d).
The first inequality follows from al being a best response to α
∗
l (i.e. al ∈ µ∗l (d)) for an
agent of degree d. The second inequality follows from Ud being decreasing in α
∗.
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Since (B.3) holds for any d, all agents have expected utility that is weakly greater in the




Proposition 4. Let F ′(µ, α) and F(µ, α) denote (8) under f˜ ′ and f˜ respectively. We know
from Theorem 4 that in a game of self-protection, qd(α) is non-decreasing in d and any
equilibrium strategy is a lower-threshold strategy. We therefore only need to consider such
strategies. It then follows from (8) that given any lower-threshold strategy µ, F ′(µ, α) ≥
F(µ, α) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Since under the assumptions, (8) has a single fixed point in α and
we conclude that T ′(µ) ≥ T (µ), where T ′(µ) and T (µ) denote the correspondence (3) under
f˜ ′ and f˜ respectively.
It then follows that
Φ′(α) = T ′(S(α))
 T (S(α))
= Φ(α)
It therefore follows that α′∗ = min{α : α = Φ′(α)} ≥ min{α : α = Φ(α)} = α∗ and that
α¯′∗ = max{α : α = Φ′(α)} ≥ max{α : α = Φ(α)} = α¯∗.
Thus, µ′∗ = S(α¯′∗)  S(α¯∗) = µ∗ and µ¯′∗ = S(α′∗)  S(α∗) = µ¯∗.
Proposition 5. Let F ′(µ, α) and F(µ, α) denote (8) under r′ and r respectively. In the case
of the contact process described in Example 1, q′d(α) > qd(α) for all α ∈ [0, 1], d > 0. It then
follows from (8) that given any strategy µ, F ′(µ, α) ≥ F(µ, α) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Since under
the assumptions, (8) has a single fixed point, we conclude that T ′(µ) ≥ T (µ), where T ′(µ)
and T (µ) denote the correspondence (3) under r′ and r respectively.
It then follows that
Φ′(α) = T ′(S(α))
 T (S(α))
= Φ(α)
It therefore follows that α′∗ = min{α : α = Φ′(α)} ≥ min{α : α = Φ(α)} = α∗ and that
α¯′∗ = max{α : α = Φ′(α)} ≥ max{α : α = Φ(α)} = α¯∗.
Thus, µ′∗ = S(α¯′∗)  S(α¯∗) = µ∗ and µ¯′∗ = S(α′∗)  S(α∗) = µ¯∗.
Proposition 6. We prove by contradiction. Suppose r′α′∗ < rα∗. Then S ′(α′∗)  S(α∗) and
thus µ′∗ ≤ µ∗. Since F ′(µ, α) ≥ F(µ, α) for any µ ∈ M and α ∈ [0, 1] and since F ′ and F
are decreasing in µ, we have that F ′(µ′∗, α) ≥ F(µ∗, α) for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
α′∗ = T ′(µ′∗)
≥ T (µ∗)
= α∗
and thus, since r′ > r, we have that r′α′∗ > rα∗, a contradiction. We conclude that
r′α′∗ ≥ rα∗.
It then follows that S ′(α′∗)  S(α∗) and thus µ′∗  µ∗. This completes the proof.
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Proposition 7. Let F ′(µ, α) and F(µ, α) denote (8) under k′ and k respectively. It follows
from (8) that given any strategy µ, F ′(µ, α) ≤ F(µ, α) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Since under the
assumptions, (8) has a single fixed point, we conclude that T ′(µ) ≤ T (µ), where T ′(µ) and
T (µ) denote the correspondence (3) under k′ and k respectively.
It then follows that
Φ′(α) = T ′(S(α))
 T (S(α))
= Φ(α)
It therefore follows that α′∗ = min{α : α = Φ′(α)} ≤ min{α : α = Φ(α)} = α∗ and that
α¯′∗ = max{α : α = Φ′(α)} ≤ max{α : α = Φ(α)} = α¯∗.
Thus, µ′∗ = S(α¯′∗)  S(α¯∗) = µ∗ and µ¯′∗ = S(α′∗)  S(α∗) = µ¯∗.
Theorem 5. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1, with only minor modifications.
Denote the function T(µ) = (T (µ),W(µ)) and let the correspondence Ψ be such that
Ψ(α, ω) = T(S(α, ω)), with the correspondence S(α, ω) defined as in Definition 15.
First, note that Ψ still has a compact domain [0, 1]× [0, 1] and a nonempty image.
Furthermore, it is also simple to show that Ψ has a closed graph. First, note that S(α, ω)
has a closed graph when we endow the set of mean-field strategies with the product topology
on [0, 1]∞. Indeed, choose any (αn, ωn) → (α, ω) and µn → µ such that µn ∈ S(αn, ωn).
Then µn(d)→ µ(d) for any d and by the continuity of Ud(1, α, ω) and Ud(0, α, ω), it follows
that µ(d) ∈ Sd(α, ω). Thus, S has a closed graph. Note also that with the product topology
on the space of mean-field strategies, T is continuous: by the bounded convergence theorem,
both T (µn) → T (µ) and W(µn) → W(µ) and therefore it is also true that T(µn) → T(µ).
We now only need to consider the sequences (αn, ωn)→ (α, ω) and (α′n, ω′n)→ (α′, ω′) where
(α′n, ω
′
n) ∈ Ψ(αn, ωn). By choosing µn ∈ S(αn, ωn) such that T (µn) = α′n and W(µn) = ω′n,
and by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can conclude that (α′, ω′) ∈
Ψ(α, ω), as desired.
Finally, the image of Ψ is convex. Indeed, T(µ) is continuous in µ. Furthermore, S(α, ω)
is convex (which follows from convexity of Sd(α, ω) for any d). Convexity of the image of Ψ
thus follows from an argument analogous to that presented in the proof of Theorem 1.
By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Ψ has a fixed point (α∗, ω∗). Letting µ∗ ∈ S(α∗, ω∗)
be such that T(µ∗) = (α∗, ω∗), we conclude that µ∗ is an MFE.
Theorem 6. Note that the incremental expected utilities for an agent of degree d in games
of total and self protection are respectively:
∆Ud(α, ω) = V · (p+ (1− p)qd(α)) k − Cg(ω) (B.4)
and
∆Ud(α, ω) = V · (pk − pkqd(α))− Cg(ω) (B.5)
It is obvious that for any given α and ω, these functions preserve the properties (i.e. mono-
tonicity in d) that were discussed in the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4. The threshold nature
of equilibria are thus maintained.
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Theorem 7. For a game of total protection, the incremental expected utility for an agent of
degree d is
∆Ud(α, ω) = V · (p+ (1− p)qd(α)) k − C · g(ω) (B.6)
We will consider the case when g(ω) is an increasing function. As in the proof of Theorem 2,
we will conduct the analysis in 4 steps.
Step 1: For all d ≥ 1, ∆Ud(α, ω) is strictly increasing in α ∈ [0, 1] and strictly decreasing
in ω ∈ [0, 1].
Step 2: Notice that α and ω are moving ∆Ud(α, ω) in opposite directions. Hence, if both
α and ω increase, we cannot conclude anything about the change in Sd(α, ω). However for
α′ > α and ω′ > ω it holds Sd(α′, ω)  Sd(α, ω′).
Step 3: For any mean-field strategies µ′, µ such that µ′(d) ≥ µ(d),∀d ≥ 1, then W(µ′) ≥
W(µ) and T (µ′) ≤ T (µ). As we have noted before, the global externality does not have a
direct impact on F(µ, α) and thus the behavior of T (µ) remains as in step 3 of the proof of
Theorem 2.
Step 4: Suppose that there are two mean-field equilibria (µ∗, α∗, ω∗) and (µ′∗, α′∗, ω′∗).
Without loss of generality assume that α′∗ > α∗. We need to consider two cases. First, if
ω′∗ ≤ ω∗, then it is true that S(α′∗, ω′∗)  S(α∗, ω∗). As µ∗ ∈ S(α∗, ω∗) and µ′∗ ∈ S(α′∗, ω′∗),
then it follows that µ′∗  µ∗. However that leads to the contradiction: α∗ = T (µ∗) ≥
T (µ′∗) = α′∗. Finally consider the case of ω′∗ > ω∗. By Theorem 6, due to the threshold
nature of the equilibrium, the equilibrium strategies can be ordered as either µ′∗  µ∗ or
µ′∗  µ∗. If µ′∗  µ∗ then ω∗ =W(µ∗) ≥ W(µ′∗) = ω′∗, which is a contradiction. If µ′∗  µ∗,
it follows that α∗ = T (µ∗) ≥ T (µ′∗) = α′∗ and we arrive at a contradiction.
Thus, we showed that in a game of total protection with both local and global externalities
(with g(·) increasing), any MFE must be unique.
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